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In 2007, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS) began implementing a schoolwide reform called the 
Teacher Advancement Program (TAP) using funds from the federal Teacher Incentive Fund (TIF) 
and private foundations. Under the TAP model, teachers can earn extra pay and responsibilities 
through promotion to mentor or master teacher as well as annual performance bonuses based on a 
combination of their value added to student achievement and observed performance in the 
classroom. The model also includes weekly meetings of teachers and mentors (―cluster groups‖), and 
regular classroom observations by a school leadership team to help teachers meet their performance 
goals. The idea behind the program is that performance incentives, combined with tools for teachers 
to track performance and improve instruction, should help schools attract and retain talented 
teachers and help all teachers produce greater student achievement. 
This report provides evidence on the impacts of TAP during the 2008-2009 school year, the 
second year of the program’s rollout in CPS. CPS began implementing its version of TAP (called 
―Chicago TAP‖) with 10 schools in the first year and has been adding 10 new TAP schools each 
year of the grant’s four-year implementation period. Chicago TAP is based on a national TAP model 
developed by the Milken Family Foundation in the late 1990s, but with some local adaptations. For 
instance, the compensation amounts are set locally and the Chicago TAP model includes 
performance pay for principals and other school staff in addition to teachers. Teachers received an 
average performance bonus of $1,100 in the first year of implementation, with a maximum payout 
of $2,045. In the second year of implementation the performance bonuses averaged just over $2,600 
to a maximum of $6,320. Teachers who were selected to be mentor teachers received a salary 
augmentation of $7,000 and lead (master) teachers received $15,000. 
After the second year of CPS rolling out TAP, we found no evidence that the program raised 
student test scores. Student achievement growth as measured by average math and reading scores on 
the Illinois Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) did not differ significantly between TAP and 
comparable non-TAP schools. 
We also found that TAP did not have a detectable impact on rates of teacher retention in the 
school or district during the second year it was rolled out in the district. We did not find statistically 
significant differences between TAP and non-TAP retention rates for teachers overall or for 
subgroups defined by teaching assignment and years of service in CPS. The findings of no 
significant impacts on student achievement or teacher retention are robust to the use of different 
samples and estimation methods. We did not have reliable data on the quality of teachers retained or 
the career paths of teachers who left TAP and non-TAP schools, but will examine these aspects of 
teacher mobility in future reports. 
Our approach to estimating the impacts of Chicago TAP is based on a hybrid study design that 
relies on both the random assignment of schools to year of implementation and the careful 
matching of TAP schools to non-TAP schools in the district. Of the 16 CPS elementary (K–8) 
schools that voluntarily applied for Chicago TAP and successfully completed the selection process, 
we randomly assigned 8 to a treatment group that began implementing TAP in 2007 (cohort 1) and 
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the other 8 to a control group that began TAP in 2008 (cohort 2). In addition, CPS purposively 
assigned two high schools and two charter schools; however, we exclude high schools and charter 
schools from this report because random assignment was not possible and their data were not 
comparable. The experimental strategy has the advantage that any systematic differences in 
outcomes between cohorts 1 and 2 of TAP schools can be causally attributed to experiencing one 
additional year of TAP implementation. On the other hand, the pool of schools to randomize was 
small. There may be chance differences between the eight treatment and eight control schools that 
make it difficult to detect true impacts. 
To complement the experimental analysis, we used propensity score matching procedures to 
form a non-TAP comparison group. We gathered administrative data on over 300 CPS schools that 
were not participating in TAP and identified the schools that were most closely matched to the TAP 
schools on pre-intervention characteristics such as size, school demographics, student achievement, 
and teacher retention. This quasi-experimental strategy does not offer the same protection against 
bias due to unobservable differences that the experimental strategy does. In order to infer program 
impacts from comparing TAP schools to matched comparison schools, we must assume that the 
observable characteristics used to match schools are sufficiently similar and comprehensive so that 
the remaining differences in outcomes can be attributed to TAP itself and not to unobserved 
factors, such as a dynamic principal or an especially motivated teaching staff. Nevertheless, the 
matched comparison group can be much larger than the experimental control group and allows us 
to compare TAP schools to schools that will remain non-TAP schools throughout the study period. 
This second-year report focuses primarily on results from the matched comparison. We reached 
the same conclusions when we used alternative estimation approaches: estimating impacts separately 
for cohort 1 schools (those that are in their second year of TAP in 2008-2009) and cohort 2 schools 
(those in their first year of TAP), using alternative matching algorithms to create different matched 
comparison groups, and estimating impacts using different regression assumptions. We also present 
experimental estimates, which showed that schools with two years of TAP implementation did not 
have better outcomes than schools that had just begun implementing the program. 
From the previous year—2007–2008—we had found no impacts on test scores for the early 
adopters of TAP (cohort 1), although we had found evidence of a positive impact on teacher 
retention in the school (Glazerman et al. 2009). Survey data covering that first year of 
implementation in cohort 1 schools indicated that changes had taken place inside the schools as a 
result of the program’s introduction. This suggested that for the period over which we have data, the 
lack of impacts in the second year of district rollout is not the result of a failure to implement TAP 
at all. At the same time, however, Chicago TAP is still in its early years of implementation and was 
not necessarily tested at its full strength. 
Several important caveats should be noted. First, we rely heavily on the matched comparison 
group as an indication of what happens in the absence of TAP. We carefully chose the comparison 
group to be observationally similar to the TAP schools. Nevertheless, there could be unobserved 
reasons why non-TAP schools were on track to have better (or worse) outcomes than their 
counterpart schools, in which case impact estimates would be biased. 
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Second, the timing of the data collection should be considered in interpreting the results. 
Student achievement was measured in March 2009, about two-thirds of the way through the second 
year of TAP implementation for cohort 1 and the first year of implementation for cohort 2. Teacher 
reforms such as TAP take time to change attitudes and alter the school culture. This report focuses 
on test scores and teacher retention, which may be thought of as final outcomes that take longer to 
change than—and may be dependent upon—intermediate outcomes such as teacher attitudes, 
knowledge, or practices. The evidence is preliminary and does not reflect the impacts of the program 
in its steady state. The study design anticipated the possibility of startup effects at both the district 
and school levels as Chicago TAP is phased in over time. For example, the performance bonus 
amounts were low and not highly differentiated in the first year. 
Finally, we caution that a lack of impact finding is simply a lack of evidence rather than a proof 
of no impact. We estimate that true impacts would need to have been about four percent of a 
standard deviation in test scores or about three percentage points of teacher retention in order for us 
to detect them. 
Future reports will present findings from the third and fourth years of Chicago TAP rollout. In 
spring 2009, we randomly assigned 16 more schools to start TAP in fall 2009 (cohort 3) or fall 2010 
(cohort 4). We will continue to follow the experiences of the first two cohorts and will add in the 
experiences of the last two cohorts. Collectively, these future reports will provide a more complete 
picture of the impacts of TAP implementation in its first few years. 
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Paying and promoting teachers for their classroom performance is gaining momentum in the 
United States. One program in particular, the Teacher Advancement Program (TAP), which links 
teacher performance measures to pay as well as mentoring and professional development, has 
become a model for schools around the country. Below we discuss TAP, how more evidence is 
needed to understand its impact on teachers and students, and our approach for generating such 
evidence. 
TAP was developed in the late 1990s by the Milken Family Foundation (MFF) as a schoolwide 
program to improve schools by raising teacher quality. Under the TAP model, teachers can earn 
extra pay and responsibilities through promotion to mentor or master teacher as well as annual 
performance bonuses based on a combination of their value added to student achievement and 
observed performance in the classroom. The model also includes weekly meetings of teachers and 
mentors (―cluster groups‖), and regular classroom observations by a school leadership team to help 
teachers meet their performance goals. The idea behind the program is that performance incentives, 
combined with tools for teachers to track performance and improve instruction, should help schools 
attract and retain talented teachers and help all teachers produce greater student achievement. 
TAP has been implemented in more than 200 schools in 13 states around the country and is 
overseen by the National Institute for Excellence in Teaching (NIET), an organization started by 
MFF. The most recent expansion of TAP came via the U.S. Department of Education’s Teacher 
Incentive Fund (TIF), which makes grants to localities implementing performance-based 
compensation systems in high-need schools. These and related efforts to reform teacher pay and 
promotion, by the Bill and Melinda Gates Foundation among others, have aroused a great deal of 
interest and controversy. The question for researchers is whether or not there is any evidence that 
TAP or other teacher pay reforms generate the intended impacts by improving the teaching 
workforce and accelerating student learning. 
Much of the existing evidence about the effects of TAP comes from four reports. The program 
developers have conducted studies of their own program (Schacter et al. 2002; 2004; Solmon et al. 
2007) and one independent research team conducted a study using schools in two unnamed states 
(Springer et al. 2008). The two studies by Schacter et al. relied on comparison groups that were 
small, self-selected samples. The more recent NIET report by Solmon et al. includes larger numbers 
of comparison schools and teachers, a total of 61 TAP and 285 non-TAP schools across six states. 
As with the two earlier reports, the comparison schools were chosen as a convenience sample and 
may not be representative of the outcomes that would have been realized in the TAP schools had 
the TAP schools not adopted the program. Because TAP schools are carefully selected and they 
typically volunteer to go through the many steps required to adopt the program, comparisons with 
non-selected schools could lead to biased program impact estimates. 
Springer et al. used a panel data set of math scores of TAP and non-TAP schools from two 
states and found positive impacts for elementary grades but undetectable or negative impacts at 
middle and high school grades. Importantly, the Springer et al. report presents evidence of selection 
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effects, which is not surprising given the screening and self-selection that must take place for a 
school to adopt TAP. To become a TAP school, the faculty must vote to adopt the program, usually 
must raise substantial funds to finance the bonus pool, and often must be found worthy of the 
investment by NIET or a state or local sponsor. 
This report focuses on one TIF grantee, the Chicago Public Schools (CPS), which began 
implementing TAP in 2007. The school system planned to add 10 new TAP schools each year of the 
grant’s four-year implementation period. Chicago’s version of TAP (called ―Chicago TAP‖) is based 
on the national model but with some local adaptations. For instance, the compensation amounts are 
set locally and the Chicago TAP model includes performance pay for principals and other school 
staff in addition to teachers. 
Mentor teachers receive $7,000 per year and lead teachers receive $15,000 as a salary 
augmentation for performing their extra duties. In the first year of implementing Chicago TAP, the 
pool for teacher performance bonuses is supposed to support an average bonus of $2,000 per 
teacher based on value added to student achievement and observed classroom performance. In 
subsequent years, the target average payout rises to $4,000 per teacher. Principals can earn up to 
$5,000 each year based on the quality of program implementation and school-wide value added. 
Other school staff can receive up to $500 in the first year and $1,000 in subsequent years based on 
school-wide value added.  
Data provided to the authors by CPS suggest that the teacher payouts averaged somewhat lower 
than the target amounts in the first two years. We found that the average performance bonus payout 
for the first year of implementation was approximately $1,100 per teacher, with a range of $0 to 
$2,045 in year 1 and $2,458 in year 2. For the second year of implementation the average payout was 
$2,653 with a maximum of $6,320. 
Chicago TAP provides a unique opportunity to learn about the impacts of the widely 
implemented TAP model. To address issues of selection bias raised above, we designed a 
randomized experiment to estimate the impacts of TAP on student and teacher outcomes. School 
officials had to apply to become a TAP school, and the selection process involved an initial 
application, site visits by TAP and CPS staff, a faculty vote (with at least 75 percent approval), and a 
successful final application with responses to essay questions. Of the 16 elementary schools that 
went through this process and were selected by district officials as finalists, we randomly assigned 8 
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to a treatment group that began implementing TAP in 2007-2008 and the other 8 to a control group 
that delayed implementation until 2008-2009.1 
This report presents findings on the impacts of Chicago TAP in all 16 CPS elementary (K-8) 
schools in 2008-2009, the second year of rollout in the district. First, however, we provide some 
background based on program implementation findings from studies conducted by the research and 
evaluation office within CPS (Foster 2008; Crown 2010) and from other data supplied by NIET and 
CPS as well as the findings from a first year impact study we completed a year ago (Glazerman et al. 
2009). 
The national TAP office rated program implementation fidelity for the Chicago TAP schools in 
this study as approximately 3 points on average on a 5-point scale, where a 5 represents ―the fullest, 
most complete, and high quality level of implementation‖ according to Program Review Reports 
supplied by CPS to the authors. Every spring, NIET conducts site visits to TAP schools to verify 
that they are implementing the program according to the organization’s standards. Schools are rated 
along several dimensions and given a summary score (―cumulative program review score‖) that 
describes their implementation. The average scores disaggregated by year and cohort (shown in 
Table I.2) are close to 3.0.  
An internal implementation study by CPS (Foster 2008) used stakeholder surveys and focus 
groups to document the degree to which staff in the TAP schools understood the program, were 
finding it helpful, and implemented it faithfully. The study reported that teachers required time to 
see TAP’s ―big picture‖ and that their understanding of the program evolved over the year. The 
majority of these teachers participated in the cluster activities focusing on learning new skills, such as 
seeing a demonstration by an expert teacher and receiving feedback from a colleague or mentor. The 
CPS implementation study also found that teachers reported TAP coaching to be more frequent 
than in the year prior to implementation and that the professional development delivered through 
the program was perceived as more effective than other forms of professional development. 
                                                 
1 All 16 schools had grades K-8, referred to in CPS as elementary schools. In addition, the district purposively 
assigned 2 high schools and 2 charter schools to implement TAP—one of each beginning in 2007 and the others in 
2008. We excluded high schools and charter schools from this report because random assignment was not possible and 
their data were not comparable. However, we will discuss charters and high schools in a future report. Twenty additional 
schools were assigned in March 2009 to implement TAP in 2009 or 2010. Those schools will be the subject of future 
impact reports from this study. 
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In a follow-up study (Crown 2010), CPS reported a generally favorable teacher reaction to TAP 
implementation, with more enthusiasm for professional development and less for performance- 
based pay. The author found that teachers in TAP schools ―assigned favorable ratings to the impact 
of TAP in their schools.‖ The study cites coaching, training, and support as the key to TAP’s 
success. Teachers report that cluster group meetings occur weekly as planned and last at least 45 
minutes in ―most, but not all‖ TAP schools. TAP teachers ―overwhelmingly endorse‖ the 
observation and coaching system, finding it to be ―very useful.‖ However, performance-based pay is 
seen to have ―a minimal impact on how teachers view their jobs, and a moderate impact on teachers’ 
motivation to improve their performance.‖ The survey showed that the first two cohorts of TAP 
teachers reported both improvements and challenges over time, with a sentiment expressed that it 
takes time for the program to become established. 
Our study differs from the NIET and CPS efforts in that we incorporate data from non-TAP 
schools to provide additional context. This allows us to describe implementation and impacts 
relative to the norm for the district or for district schools that might have implemented TAP but did 
not. The first year results from our study were presented in 2009 (Glazerman et al. 2009). In that 
report we showed that the introduction of TAP led to reported changes inside the school that were 
consistent with the TAP program model. Teachers reported receiving higher levels of mentoring 
support than their control group counterparts. Veteran teachers reported providing support to their 
colleagues at levels consistent with program expectations, although their control group counterparts 
generally reported providing similar levels of support. Furthermore, compensation expectations for 
both TAP and non-TAP teachers were consistent on average with the expected payouts of 
performance-based bonuses, which were present in TAP schools and absent in non-TAP schools. 
However, these changes had not produced measurable impacts on test scores as of March 2008, the 
first year of the program. We did find evidence that TAP increased retention of teachers in their 
schools.2 We also reported that 88 percent of TAP teachers versus 83 percent of non-TAP teachers 
(a statistically significant difference) returned to their schools for the start of the next year (fall 
2008). Teachers in TAP schools did not report higher satisfaction or more positive attitudes toward 
their principals than did control teachers. While we did not find evidence of impact on these positive 
attitudes, we also did not find evidence of negative attitudes. Specifically, we did not find any 
evidence that TAP, which involves differentiated pay, harmed the school climate. 
The rest of this report discusses the results from our analysis of the second year of Chicago 
TAP rollout. In Chapter II we discuss the methods and data used and describe the characteristics of 
students and teachers in the study sample. The impacts of TAP on student achievement in the 
2008–2009 school year are described in Chapter III and in Chapter IV we present the impacts of 
TAP on teacher retention. Chapter V summarizes the findings, noting important caveats and 
limitations, and discusses future reports from the study. 
 
                                                 
2 The analysis of teacher retention was not based on the randomized control group, but a matched comparison 
group, as discussed in Chapter II of this report. 
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Our approach to estimating the impacts of Chicago TAP is based on a hybrid study design that 
relies on both the random assignment of schools to year of implementation and the careful 
matching of TAP schools to non-TAP CPS schools. Below we discuss these methods in detail as 
well as the data on which the analysis is based and present some simple descriptive statistics on the 
study sample. 
This study relies on a hybrid design that employs two parallel design strategies. First, we 
randomly assigned 16 pre-selected3 K–8 schools to either a treatment group that began 
implementing TAP in 2007 or to a control group that began TAP in 2008.4 The treatment group will 
be referred to as cohort 1 and the control group as cohort 2. Comparisons between cohorts 1 and 2 
can be informative, but they have some limitations, as discussed below.  
Second, we used propensity score matching to form a comparison group. We gathered 
administrative data on over 300 Chicago schools that were not participating in TAP and identified 
the schools, using methods described below, that were most closely matched to the TAP schools in 
order to form an additional comparison group for cohorts 1 and 2 schools.  
We refer to the random assignment strategy as ―experimental‖ and the matched comparison is 
considered ―quasi-experimental.‖ Both design strategies have advantages that complement each 
other and offset disadvantages.  
The experimental strategy has the advantage that any systematic differences in outcomes 
between cohorts 1 and 2 of TAP schools can be causally attributed to the early implementation of 
the program. In the first year of the study’s observation period, the 2007–2008 school year, this 
provides us with a comparison between TAP and non-TAP schools. In subsequent years, such as 
the one covered by this report, we must interpret the differences in outcomes between these cohorts 
as the effect of having one extra year of experience implementing the program. 
A disadvantage of the experimental design is the reliance on just sixteen schools. There may be 
chance differences between the eight treatment and eight control schools that make it difficult to 
detect any true impacts.  
Another drawback of random assignment to a delayed implementation status is that once the 
delay period is over, the control group is no longer untreated. For outcomes that can be affected by 
knowledge of future implementation, such as teacher retention, the randomized control group is 
never a pure standard of comparison. That is, the control group is also affected by TAP, although 
                                                 
3 The schools had been pre-selected by CPS using a series of school information sessions, initial interest 
applications, and site visits to assess staff’s ability and readiness to benefit from the program. 
4 We also collected data on two high schools and two charter schools, one of each was assigned by CPS to begin 
TAP implementation in 2007 and the others to begin in 2008. Because the charter and high schools were not randomly 
assigned and data was not available on test scores (for high schools) or teacher assignments (for charter schools), we 
focus this report on CPS elementary (K-8) schools. 
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less directly than the treatment group. On the other hand, the matched comparison group can be 
much larger than the randomized control group and its members would continue to be non-TAP 
schools during the course of the study, allowing more years for a comparison between TAP and 
non-TAP schools. However, in order to use the matched comparison group to infer program 
impacts, we must assume that the observable characteristics used to match schools are sufficiently 
similar and comprehensive so that the remaining differences in outcomes can be attributed to TAP 
itself and not to other factors that were not observed, such as a dynamic principal or a motivated 
teaching staff. 
1.  Random Assignment Procedures 
The schools were not assigned with equal probability to treatment and control groups. Some 
schools were thought by the district to be more ready to implement the program. To accommodate 
the preference for schools of greater readiness, we had the program manager rate each prospective 
school as A, B, or C, with A being most ready and C being least ready. We then assigned to the 
treatment group the schools in group A with the highest probability (three out of four), group B 
with the next highest probability (three out of seven), and group C with the lowest probability (two 
out of five). Comparisons between cohorts 1 and 2 in this report are weighted to reflect the unequal 
treatment assignment probabilities (where weights are the inverse of the assignment probabilities), 
so that they represent the original sample. To reflect the theoretical probability of assignment to 
cohort 1 or 2, matched comparison schools are given an assignment probability weight of .50, where 
such weights are used and all three groups are compared. As discussed below, however, the featured 
results combine cohorts 1 and 2 and therefore do not incorporate randomization weights. The 
results did not change whether we used weights or not. (Comparisons that combine cohorts 1 and 2 
and that involve the matched comparison group are discussed in Section B, below). 
To increase statistical precision, we randomized schools in such a way as to balance school size, 
the predominant race/ethnicity of the student population, and geographic location. This method is 
based on constrained minimization (see Glazerman et al. 2006). Specifically, we imposed constraints 
on the randomization that required the largest and smallest school (in terms of student enrollment) 
to be in the same TAP cohort (treatment or control), prevented the three schools with a student 
body that was not predominantly African American from being in the same cohort, and prevented 
either cohort from having more than one pair of schools from the same geographic area of the city. 
2.  Propensity Score Matching Procedures 
Propensity score matching methods were used to identify non-TAP schools whose students 
were as nearly similar to the TAP schools as possible (see Appendix A for a technical discussion of 
the quality of the matches achieved). We first eliminated schools that had fewer than 50 percent of 
their students eligible for free or reduced price lunch. In order to be selected for TAP in Chicago, a 
school has to have at least 75 percent of its students qualifying for free or reduce price lunch. We 
also eliminated from consideration any schools that had been selected to implement TAP beginning 
in either fall 2009 or 2010. Teacher behavior in these schools may have been influenced by their 
knowledge that the school was slated to begin the program in the near future. Then we matched the 
remaining schools along dimensions we believed to be related to the study’s outcomes of interest: 
student achievement and teacher retention. All variables were measured before any schools 
implemented TAP. We matched along the following dimensions: 
 School size, measured using student enrollment and student enrollment squared (to 
capture non-linearities in the relationship between size and outcomes) 
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 Teacher retention, measured as the percentage of novice teachers (with less than 5 years 
of experience) in 2005 who returned to the school in 2006 and the percentage of mid-
career teachers (5–24 years of experience) in 2005 who returned in 2006 
 School accountability status, measured as indicators of the number of years since the 
school last met adequate yearly progress (AYP) as of 2006–2007 
 Student achievement, measured using average math and reading scores on the Illinois 
Standards Achievement Test (ISAT) from March 2007, standardized within grade across 
the district 
 Student race/ethnicity, measured as the percentage of students in 2006–2007 who were 
non-Hispanic African American or Hispanic, collapsed into three categories: more than 
two-thirds, between one-third and two-thirds, and less than one-third 
 Student poverty, measured as the percentage of students qualifying for free or reduced 
price lunch 
 High truancy, measured as an indicator for schools that have more than 50 percent of its 
students truant during the 2006–2007 school year 
The procedure itself is a propensity score match with a fixed caliper. That means that we listed 
the observable factors that predict selection into the TAP finalist pool (treatment or control) and 
used them in a logistic regression model to predict the probability of being in that pool. The 
predicted probability (―propensity score‖) from this model was used to rank all the schools 
sequentially along a number line, and each TAP school (cohort 1 or 2) was matched to all of the 
non-TAP schools whose propensity score fell within a fixed distance or caliper.5 If non-TAP schools 
matched with more than one TAP school, then they received proportionally more weight in the 
analysis. 
The result of this matching was a group of non-TAP schools that was observationally similar to 
the TAP schools once we applied the appropriate weights. The degree of similarity is illustrated in 
Section D of this chapter and in Appendix A, which provides more technical details on the 
matching. We made our decision to feature results using the particular matching algorithm and 
caliper size that we chose before seeing the outcome data, based solely on the quality of the match. 
However, we drew the same conclusions when we used alternative matching methods. 
The impacts of TAP can be estimated by comparing the outcomes observed in TAP schools to 
those observed for similar non-TAP schools. The non-TAP schools are used to approximate the 
counterfactual condition, that is, the outcomes that would have been observed had the TAP schools 
not implemented the program. After two years of TAP in Chicago, we have several comparisons to 
choose from. Cohorts 1 and 2 can be considered individually or together—and there are several 
                                                 
5 We determined that a caliper with a radius size of 0.025 produced the most efficient matches but we repeated all 
the analyses using different caliper sizes. We also used different matching algorithms including ones that selected the 
nearest neighbor on the number line, nearest five neighbors, and all neighbors with weights related to distance (known 
as kernel density matching). 
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ways to form a comparison group of non-TAP schools, depending on which matching algorithm we 
follow.  
We focus here primarily on results from the comparison of all TAP schools (cohorts 1 and 2) 
with the matched comparison group of non-TAP schools. We then show that we generally reach the 
same conclusions if we use any of the alternative approaches: use cohort 1 schools alone (those that 
are in their second year of TAP in 2008–2009) and cohort 2 schools alone (those in their first year of 
TAP), if we use alternative matching algorithms, and if we estimate impacts using different 
regression assumptions. All of these results are quasi-experimental. 
The ―experimental‖ comparison is somewhat more difficult to interpret for the 2008–2009 
school year. It represents the effect, in a TAP school’s second year, of a one-year implementation 
head start. In a design report (Glazerman et al. 2007), we proposed summing the experimental 
impacts from years 1 and 2 to obtain the cumulative impact of implementing TAP for two years. 
While we present these estimates as well, the evidence from the two years and two cohorts does not 
support the hypothesis that TAP impacts are positive and grow over time, so the 2008-2009 
experimental comparison is less informative and plays a less prominent role in the presentation of 
findings than the quasi-experimental comparison. 
1.  Dropouts, Consolidations, and School Closures 
Effective for the 2009–2010 school year, two TAP schools discontinued the program and 
another TAP school was closed and its faculty and students consolidated with a non-TAP school. 
These events pose a complication for the estimation of TAP impacts. Fortunately, the matching 
method provides a straightforward solution because each school effectively has its own comparison 
group. Thus, if a TAP school discontinues the program, we assume that the matched non-TAP 
school(s) would likely have discontinued the program as well, had they originally adopted the 
program. 
For the test score analysis, we did not need to make any adjustments to account for these 
transitions. Because the staff knew of these changes late in the 2008–2009 school year, we assume 
that they did not affect the March 2009 test score results.  
For the teacher retention analysis, however, we did have to drop some observations from the 
analysis. This analysis measures the outcome (teachers returning to the same school or to the 
district) as of fall 2009—after the school changes took place—so we dropped the affected schools 
and their matches. Specifically, we dropped from the analysis the two program leavers and the 
consolidating school as well as their comparison group counterparts.  
2.  Regression-Adjusted Means 
When presenting outcomes in this report, we typically show ―regression-adjusted‖ means. A 
regression-adjusted mean for a particular group (e.g., TAP schools) represents a predicted average 
outcome for the entire analysis sample (including non-TAP schools) if everyone had been assigned 
to that group. The prediction is based on a regression model—a linear model for continuous 
outcomes and a logistic model for dichotomous outcomes—that controls for a range of teacher or 
student characteristics. Regression-adjusted means have the useful property that their difference 
equals the impact estimate, although they do typically differ slightly from the unadjusted mean.  
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By way of illustration,  the regression-adjusted mean 2009 ISAT test score in reading was 219.6 
for students in TAP cohort 1 schools when we used the sample that included only TAP cohorts 1 
and 2 schools. When we compared cohort 1 schools to matched comparison schools, we obtained a 
regression-adjusted mean outcome in the TAP schools of 225.6 points on the reading ISAT. The 
discrepancy of 6.0 points simply represents the difference in the types of students who happened to 
be in each sample, neither of which is incorrect, and does not affect the impact estimate, which 
remains unbiased. 
For teacher retention analyses, the regression model controlled for teacher education (having a 
master’s or higher degree), teaching assignment (teaching a tested or non-tested academic subject in 
grades four through eight), years of service in CPS, teacher retention at the school (percentage of 
novice teachers and percentage of mid-career teachers in 2005 who returned to the school in 2006), 
student achievement (average math and reading ISAT scores), student race/ethnicity (percentage of 
students who were African American or Hispanic), student language (percentage of students who 
were limited English proficient), student poverty (percentage of students who qualified for 
free/reduced-price lunch), and school size. For student test score analyses, we controlled for family 
poverty (eligibility for free/reduced-price lunch), special needs (whether an individualized education 
plan was in place), language (whether limited English proficient), race/ethnicity, grade level, and 
over normal age for a grade. We accounted for the clustering of students or teachers within schools 
by estimating robust standard errors. In addition, we conducted numerous sensitivity tests to 
determine whether the results were robust to the choice of regression model or other decisions. 
Those tests are described in more detail in the discussion of findings. 
The data from this report come from CPS—assessment data from student testing records and 
information on teachers from human resources records.  
1. Student Achievement Data 
We obtained student assessment data on tests routinely collected by CPS including test scores 
on state assessments in mathematics and reading for grades three through eight. In addition, we 
obtained data on student background information, such as race, gender, free/reduced-price lunch 
eligibility, enrollment status, and disability or special education status. CPS provided these data for 
the 2006–2007 through 2008–2009 school years and we will request future years of data through at 
least 2010–2011 for future reports. 
To support TAP and related policies for data-driven school improvement, researchers at the 
University of Wisconsin provided CPS with estimates of each school’s value added to student 
achievement. In addition to our analysis of student-level test score data, we also examined the school 
value-added measures and found similar conclusions, although with far less statistical precision. 
2. Administrative Teacher Data  
Administrative records data on teacher credentials, years of service in the district, and teaching 
assignment were provided to us by the CPS department of human resources. Data covers the 2005–
2006 through 2009–2010 school years and the study aims to request similar data in future years.  
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Figures II.1 through II.3 show the characteristics of the schools in the study by examining their 
students at baseline and their teachers during the study period. The statistics are presented by school 
group, with students and teachers in TAP cohort 1 schools compared to their counterparts in cohort 
2 and matched comparison schools. We present tests of statistical significance of the difference 
between cohort 1 and each of the other two groups. Readers should be aware that statistical 
significance is not the same as policy relevance. A great degree of similarity in these observable 
student and teacher characteristics is reassuring, but not necessary for unbiased estimation of the 
experimental impacts of TAP because we control for observable differences through regression 
adjustment. What is required is that the groups be similar in terms of unobserved determinants of 
student achievement growth and teacher retention. Readers should exercise caution in interpreting 
the quasi-experimental findings because these unobserved determinants of student achievement and 
teacher mobility may be confounded with TAP status, leading to bias of unknown direction and 
magnitude. 
Figure II.1 shows the balance in terms of characteristics of the students attending in 2006-2007, 
the year before TAP was introduced.6 Race/ethnicity and family income are proxied by eligibility for 
free/reduced-price lunch. The cohort 2 schools had significantly more African American and fewer 
Hispanic students than cohort 1 schools at baseline. Some difference along this dimension was 
unavoidable even with random assignment (or any assignment rule) because there were only three 
schools without a majority of African-American students and three cannot be divided evenly 
between two groups. For the same reason, cohort 2 schools had fewer limited English proficient 
(LEP) students as well. The percentage of students with low family income (percent eligible for 
free/reduced-price lunch) was more than 90 percent in the cohort 1, cohort 2, and comparison 
groups, although the cohort 1 versus cohort 2 difference (97 versus 94 percent) was statistically 
significant. We did find not any statistically significant differences between cohort 1, cohort 2, or 
matched comparison schools in terms of 2007 test scores (Figure II.2); nor did we find any 
significant differences in the characteristics of teachers in cohort 1 schools and cohort 2 or 
comparison schools in 2008-2009 (Figure II.3). 
 
 
                                                 
6 These student characteristics are presented to illustrate the types of schools included in the study but are not 
identical to the students who were used in the test score analysis sample pertaining to the 2008-2009 school year. We 
tabulated statistics for those students from the impact analysis sample and found similar results as those presented here. 
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Differences  cohort 1 and cohort 2 teachers and between cohort 1 and matched comparison teachers are 
not statistically significant at the 10% level. 
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According to CPS, Chicago TAP was designed to support and develop high quality teaching, 
which in turn would boost student learning (Chicago TAP 2009). Consequently, student test scores 
are the main outcomes of interest for the study. We focus on tested grades and subjects: math and 
reading in grades four through eight. This chapter explains our findings—after the second year of 
CPS rolling out TAP, we found no evidence that the program was associated with increases in 
student test scores. 
As discussed in Chapter II, we followed three groups of schools: one group began 
implementing TAP in fall 2007 (cohort 1), one in fall 2008 (cohort 2), and the third group was not 
scheduled to implement TAP at all. TAP schools were assigned by lottery to cohort 1 or 2 so that 
the only systematic difference between those two groups of schools was the timing of their TAP 
implementation. The no-TAP comparison group was formed using propensity score matching, also 
discussed in Chapter II. 
We first summarize the data for these groups over time in Figures III.1 and III.2. The data are 
descriptive and may reflect many factors beyond TAP implementation, but they serve as a useful 
starting point for examining outcomes for the study population. 
Also discussed in Chapter II, all three groups had similar ISAT test scores in March 2007, 
before TAP began. In fact, each group of schools had average ISAT scores within one point of the 
others in reading (Figure III.1) and two points in math (Figure III.2).7 In March 2008, after TAP had 
been introduced in cohort 1 schools, the test scores for the three groups were higher for the two 
groups that were not implementing TAP in that year, but scores for all three groups were still within 
two points of each other.  
The scores for the third year, 2009, present a more pronounced version of the same pattern 
observed in 2008. The mean test scores for cohort 2 schools were five points higher than cohort 1 
schools in reading and four points in math. In that year, however, both cohorts 1 and 2 were 
implementing TAP. The cohort 1 schools were in their second year of the program and the cohort 2 
schools had just begun implementation. The average test scores of cohort 2 schools were three 
points higher than the non-TAP schools in both subjects.8 
The mean test scores shown in Figures III.1 and III.2 are not adjusted to account for variations 
in grade level and student background characteristics, which are important for making apples to 
apples comparisons. The rest of this chapter presents regression-adjusted means for each group and 
                                                 
7 For perspective, these numbers can be compared to the standard deviations of the ISAT scores, which varied by 
grade and subject but were approximately 25 points within grade level—27 points across grades for reading and 30 
points across grades for math. 
8 The unadjusted test scores in Figures III.1 and III.2 include students in grade 3, who were not included in the 
impact estimation sample because they did not take a test in the prior year. The patterns of unadjusted scores for grades 
4 through 8 (not shown) are nearly identical to those presented here. 
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formal hypothesis tests to determine the statistical significance of each contrast. As we show, the 
impact of TAP on test scores is not statistically significant. 
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Below we present estimates of the impact of TAP schools in the second year of rollout—cohort 
1 schools in their second year and cohort 2 schools in their first year. An earlier report from this 
study showed that by March 2008, the schools implementing TAP in 2007–2008 (cohort 1) did not 
have significantly higher test scores than the comparison group of non-TAP schools(Glazerman et 
al. 2009). 
The results summarized in Table III.1 show that the differences in reading and math test scores 
between students in TAP schools and similar non-TAP schools were not statistically significant in 
March 2009. The regression-adjusted ISAT math and reading scores, shown in Table III.1, control 
for baseline test scores and student background characteristics. These results represent the estimated 
mean scores in March 2009 from a growth model, which accounts for the March 2008 achievement 
level. The estimated score for students in a TAP school was 226 points on the reading test, the same 
as that for students in comparison schools. For math, the estimated impact (242 scale points for 
TAP versus 241 for comparison) was equal to two percent of a standard deviation and was not 
statistically significant.9  
Disaggregating the results by grade level conveys a similar picture of no significant differences 
between TAP and non-TAP comparison students. Because the ISAT is vertically scaled, the scores 
should be higher for each grade level and the score level comparisons within grade have a more 
meaningful interpretation. In fact, they can be compared to state-set criteria for whether the students 
are meeting standards. The average reading and math scores shown in Table III.2 were in the 
category for ―meets standards‖ for every grade and both subjects.10 None of the TAP-comparison 
differences was statistically significant. 
                                                 
9 Standard deviations used to calculate effect sizes are derived from the distribution of the full sample for each 
outcome. Grade three is not included in the benchmark impact analysis because there is no pretest. 
10 The range of scores that define each category can be found in the official 2009 guide to the ISAT issued by the 
state (Illinois State Board of Education 2009). 
III: Impact on Student Achievement  Mathematica Policy Research 
 18  
We found that the results were robust. To test the sensitivity of the findings, we re-estimated 
the test score impacts several times, with each new model making one change to the model used in 
Table III.1. We refer to this as the benchmark against which alternative models are compared. The 
results are summarized in Tables III.3 and III.4. For our sensitivity tests, we estimated impacts with 
weights that accounted for the unequal assignment probabilities of schools to cohort 1 or 2 (referred 
to as ―readiness weights‖ after the measure of readiness used to stratify the schools before random 
assignment), with limited or no covariates, with a specification that treated the school effect as a 
random variable, and with specifications that correct for pretest measurement error using a variety 
of methods. We also tried several alternative methods for constructing the comparison group and 
found that the matching method did not make a substantial difference.11 The impact estimates 
changed only slightly under the alternative specifications and their size was always within two or 
three hundredths of a standard deviation in student test scores for both reading and math. None of 
the differences was statistically significant. 
 
  
                                                 
11 The alternative matching algorithms are described in Chapter II. The different algorithms make tradeoffs 
between quality of the match and quantity of units matching to the original. In some cases we lose the ability to include 
certain Chicago TAP schools for which we cannot find acceptable matches, but the results did not change when we 
restricted the sample in this way. 
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The findings presented above combined cohorts 1 and 2 to obtain an overall estimate of the 
TAP effect in 2008–2009. We examined whether the average impact estimate masked significant 
impacts for one cohort or the other and found that it did not. Table III.5 presents impact estimates 
for the TAP group defined as cohort 1 only or cohort 2 only, in each case comparing to the matched 
comparison group. In both cases the impact estimate was not significantly different from zero for 
reading or for math. We conducted sensitivity tests for these contrasts using the same approach as 
the sensitivity analysis presented above and found that the lack of significant impacts was a robust 
finding. 
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It is possible that unobservable differences between the TAP schools and their matched 
comparisons are confounded with treatment effects. For example, if the TAP selection process 
identified the schools that were struggling the most despite similarities with other schools in terms 
of test scores and demographics, then the observed impact estimates would understate the true 
impacts of TAP. If this were the case, then an alternative approach would be to rely only on 
experimental impacts (those determined through random assignment of schools to cohort 1 or 2). 
The experimental impact after two years would be defined as the sum of year 1 differences between 
cohorts 1 and 2 and year 2 differences between the same sets of schools (Glazerman et al. 2007). For 
example, if TAP has a beneficial impact that increases over time as schools gain experience with the 
program, we would expect to see a positive difference, favoring cohort 1 relative to cohort 2, in each 
year. The positive difference (in favor of cohort 1) in year 2 would indicate an improvement in 
average student achievement during the second year of implementation beyond that experienced in 
the first year of implementation. 
The data, however, are not consistent with a hypothesis that TAP has a more beneficial effect 
as schools spend more time with the program. Table III.6 shows that the differences in the first 
year, while not statistically significant, favor cohort 2, which had not yet begun implementing TAP; 
differences in the second year still favored cohort 2. Thus, the estimated cumulative experimental 
effect is negative. When we estimated the cumulative experimental impact using longitudinal data 
(see Appendix B), we were able to conduct a formal test of the statistical significance of the 
cumulative impact estimate. The cumulative effect was negative and statistically significant for both 
math and reading. When we accounted for the fact that TAP may have improved outcomes in 
cohort 2 schools, however, the cumulative experimental impact was smaller and not significantly 
different from zero. 
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These findings could mean that either starting TAP too early had a harmful effect on a school’s 
ability to raise student achievement or that there was a difference between the two groups, where 
cohort 2 happened to have better outcomes.  
Unfortunately, the data supported the possibility of both hypotheses being correct without 
being able to distinguish between them. We complemented the experimental analysis by estimating a 
regression using the longitudinal data set including cohorts 1 and 2 and the matched comparison 
schools. This analysis included student test score and demographic data from 2007–2009. Using this 
approach, we estimated an overall TAP effect, a cohort effect, and the experimental impact (TAP 
interacted with cohort). These analyses made the most efficient use of the pre-intervention measures 
of the outcomes, providing measures of student growth over time for each school. The result was 
that the cohort effect, which favored cohort 2, was statistically significant for reading but not math. 
The TAP effect for cohort 1 was negative and significant for reading, but not for math. All of the 
effect estimates, both positive and negative, were less than 2 ISAT points. The full set of results is 
presented in Appendix B. 
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TAP is hypothesized to help schools retain their best teachers by rewarding performance, 
providing professional development and leadership opportunities, and creating a sense of a career 
ladder. In this chapter we examine the impacts of TAP on teacher retention rates, defined as the 
percentages of teachers returning to the school or the district from year to year, or in some cases 
over a longer period. We did not find a detectable difference between TAP and similar non-TAP 
schools on teacher retention in the school or district during the second year the program was rolled 
out in the district. In future reports, when more detailed data are available, we will examine the 
groups of teachers retained and follow the career paths of those who left TAP and non-TAP 
schools. 
As noted in Chapter II, knowledge of a school’s future TAP implementation may influence the 
career plans of its teachers. The two TAP cohorts learned of their future participation in spring 
2007, with implementation to begin in fall 2007 for cohort 1 and fall 2008 for cohort 2; schools in 
the third group, the matched comparison group, were not scheduled to implement TAP at all.  
Figures IV.1 and IV.2 show school and district retention rates, respectively, for the three groups 
over time.12 These data are descriptive and may reflect many factors beyond TAP implementation, 
but they serve as a useful starting point for examining outcomes for the study population. 
In 2005–2006, prior to any knowledge of future TAP participation, all three groups had similar 
school retention rates (Figure IV.1). Each group had an average school retention rate within one 
point of the other two groups. 
More pronounced differences in school retention rates emerged in 2006–2007, the year when 
the TAP cohorts learned when they would start TAP. Cohort 2 and non-TAP comparison schools 
continued to have average rates that were within one point of one another. However, the average 
school retention rate in cohort 1 schools exceeded that of the other two groups by more than seven 
percentage points. 
                                                 
12 Due to differences in data availability, the definition of retention varies slightly across years. The 2005–2006 
school retention rate is defined as the percentage of fall 2005 classroom teachers who returned to the same schools as 
classroom teachers in fall 2006. For 2006–2007 and all subsequent years, the school retention rate is defined as the 
percentage of classroom teachers who returned to the same schools in any education-related capacity, regardless of 
whether they are a classroom teacher. Similarly, the 2005–2006 district retention rate is the percentage of fall 2005 
classroom teachers who return to CPS as classroom teachers, whereas the district retention rate in subsequent years is 
the percentage of teachers who return to CPS in any education-related capacity. We did not have the data to create the 
more general set of retention variables for 2005–2006. For 2006–2009, the results are substantively similar regardless of 
which set of definitions we use. 
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In 2007–2008, the TAP cohorts exhibited school retention rates that were similar to one 
another but higher than the average retention rate in the non-TAP comparison schools. Average  
school retention rates at cohort 1 and 2 schools differed by less than one point. For both TAP 
cohorts, school retention rates exceeded the comparison group rates on average by nearly four 
points. 
 
All three groups experienced similar school retention rates to one another in 2008–2009. In that 
school year, when both cohorts 1 and 2 were implementing TAP, the average retention rate for 
cohort 1 schools was about one point higher than the average rates for the other two groups. 
Average district retention rates between groups differed by three or fewer points each year 
(Figure IV.2). In 2005–2006, each group had an average district retention rate within three points of 
the other two groups. Unlike the finding for school retention, we did not find a pronounced 
difference between cohort 1 schools and the other schools (cohort 2 or non-TAP comparison) in 
2006–2007; the cohort 1 average district retention rate was within three points of the cohort 2 rate 
and within one point of the comparison group rate. In 2007-2008, the average district retention rate 
in cohort 1 exceeded the comparison group rate by less than three points and was within one point 
of the cohort 2 rate. In 2008–2009, average district retention rates in the TAP cohorts were nearly 
identical to one another and exceeded the non-TAP comparison group rate by less than one point.  
The average retention rates shown in Figures IV.1 and IV.2 are not regression adjusted and may 
reflect differences in school or teacher background characteristics that are not related to TAP. In the 
remainder of this chapter we present regression-adjusted findings for the second year of TAP 
implementation in CPS. We focus on the comparison between all TAP schools with the non-TAP 
matched comparison group and conduct formal hypothesis tests to determine whether the 
differences are likely to be ―real‖ or just reflective of chance differences. As discussed below, we do 
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not find evidence of a statistically significant impact of TAP on either school retention or district 
retention. 
 
Below we present regression-adjusted estimates of the impact of TAP from the second year of 
rollout. Results from the first year—2007–2008—suggested that TAP increased the retention rate of 
teachers in their schools (Glazerman et al. 2009). In the second year, we found evidence of a positive 
impact on school retention in cohort 1 schools both for teachers overall and for teachers in non-
tested academic subjects, although we were not able to detect impacts for other teaching assignment 
subgroups. We did not find a measurable impact on district retention. 
After controlling for teacher baseline characteristics, we did not find a detectable impact of 
TAP on school retention during the second year (Table IV.1). For TAP schools (cohorts 1 and 2 
combined), we estimated that 85 percent of 2008–2009 teachers returned to the same schools in 
2009–2010, versus 84 percent for comparison schools; this one-point difference was not statistically 
significant. 
We hypothesized that teachers in tested grades would behave differently than those in non-
tested grades because they differed in their ability to affect value-added measures that help 
determine performance-based compensation. We did not find evidence in support of this 
hypothesis. For each teaching assignment subgroup, average school retention rates differed by less 
than two points between TAP and non-TAP schools; the differences were not statistically 
significant. 
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We also examined teacher experience subgroups, defined by years of service in CPS. None of 
the TAP-comparison differences by years of service subgroups was statistically significant.  
We did not find statistically significant differences when we defined retention as staying in the 
district. Table IV.2 shows the percentage of 2008–2009 teachers in TAP and non-TAP comparison 
schools who returned to CPS in 2009–2010. We found no significant differences overall. The 
regression-adjusted district retention rate for TAP teachers was 95 percent and for teachers in 
comparison schools it was 94 percent. None of the subgroup impacts, also shown in Table IV.2, was 
statistically significant. 
As shown in Tables IV.3 and IV.4, the findings of no detectable impact on teacher retention is 
robust to several alternative estimation approaches. Comparing unadjusted average school retention 
rates—that is, estimating the impact without covariates—yielded a difference of less than one point 
between TAP and non-TAP schools (Table IV.3). When we estimated the school retention impact 
separately by cohort, comparing each TAP cohort to the non-TAP matched comparison group, we 
again did not find significant impacts. We also tried several alternative algorithms to construct the 
non-TAP matched comparison group; none of the differences between the TAP group and the 
alternative comparison groups was statistically significant. The lack of a statistically significant 
impact on district retention is similarly robust to these alternative approaches (Table IV.4).  
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To provide another perspective on retention, we also compared the two-year teacher retention 
rates in cohort 1 and non-TAP schools (Table IV.5). The two-year school retention rate is the 
percentage of fall 2007 teachers who returned to the same schools in fall 2009; the two year district 
retention rate is the percentage of fall 2007 teachers who returned to CPS in fall 2009. The average 
two-year school retention rate for cohort 1 was higher than that for non-TAP comparison schools 
(76 percent versus 72 percent), but the difference is not statistically significant. Average two-year 
district retention rates differed by less than two points; the difference is not statistically significant. 
We also examined impacts of TAP on the pattern of teacher mobility, focusing on where the 
movers went. Table IV.6 reports percentages of TAP and comparison teachers by their 2009–2010 
destinations. The percentages were similar across TAP and non-TAP schools, differing by less than 
one point for each destination. The difference in the overall pattern of mobility was not statistically 
significant. These results are not regression adjusted but are consistent with the regression-adjusted 
findings of no impacts of TAP on school or district retention in the second program year. 
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The pattern of unadjusted school retention rates over time offers suggestive evidence of an 
anticipatory effect of TAP on teacher retention at the school level. For cohorts 1 and 2, the 
difference between the TAP and the non-TAP comparison group in average school retention rates 
was greatest in the year prior to starting TAP. However, our robust finding of no detectable retention 
impact in the second year of program rollout in the district suggests that any positive anticipatory 
effect was, at best, temporary. The positive overall school retention effect found in the first year for 
cohort 1 did not persist in its second program year. The average school retention rate for cohort 2 
schools in its first year of implementing TAP was nearly identical to that of the non-TAP 
comparison group in the same year. Overall, we do not find evidence of an impact of TAP on 
teacher retention during the second year of rollout. 
Policymakers care not only about the retention rate, but the quality of teachers who are 
retained. If TAP is successful in rewarding effective teachers, then ineffective teachers would prefer 
to leave the school and more effective teachers would prefer to stay on longer than they would 
otherwise. All else equal, one would expect such an improvement in the mix of teachers to result in 
more effective teachers accounting for a higher proportion of the teacher workforce remaining in 
TAP schools than in comparison schools. Unfortunately, we do not currently have access to reliable 
measures that describe teacher effectiveness for both TAP and non-TAP schools.  
However, we did examine scores obtained by teachers in TAP schools on a classroom 
observation rubric known as Skills, Knowledge, and Responsibilities (SKR). As part of establishing 
instructionally focused accountability, the Chicago TAP model calls for observations of teachers 
conducted by the principal, lead teachers, and mentor teachers, all of whom undergo training and 
certification in using the TAP SKR rubric. SKR scores are assigned based on observed classroom 
performance in four domains: designing and planning instruction, learning environment, instruction, 
and responsibilities. Each domain is rated on a five-point scale, with 1 indicating ―needs 
improvement‖, 3 indicating ―proficient‖, and 5 indicating ―exemplary‖. The composite SKR scores 
are used in determining performance-based compensation.  
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The average SKR score in TAP schools in 2008-2009 was 3.1 on a five-point scale, with a 
standard deviation of 0.6 points (meaning that about half the population scored between 2.7 and 
3.5). Table IV.7 reports average SKR scores among three groups of teachers based on their 
movement from 2008-2009 to 2009-2010: stayers, who remained in the same school; movers, who 
moved to another CPS school or to a citywide or central office position within CPS; and leavers, 
who left CPS. Teachers who left TAP schools (movers) had lower average SKR scores (2.8) than 
stayers (3.1) or leavers (3.2). This variation is statistically significant.13 This finding suggests that 
teacher mobility may indeed affect the quality composition of teachers who remain in TAP schools.  
This descriptive analysis does not provide causal evidence of TAP’s impact on teacher quality 
because SKR scores were not available for non-TAP schools; therefore, we cannot estimate what the 
SKR scores of stayers, movers, and leavers would have been in the absence of TAP. In future 
reports we will estimate the impact of TAP on the quality of the teacher workforce if performance 
measures such as evaluation ratings or teacher value-added estimates become available for both TAP 
and non-TAP teachers. 
 
 
                                                 
13 We conducted an F-test using analysis of variance and rejected the hypothesis that the three average SKR scores 
were the same. 
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This report focused on student and teacher outcomes in CPS K-8 elementary schools during 
the 2008–2009 school year, the second year of Chicago TAP’s rollout. During that year, there were 
eight elementary schools in their second year of implementation and eight more in their first year. 
We compared these 16 schools as a group to a carefully matched group of comparison schools and 
found that test score growth was not measurably better, nor were there detectable impacts on the 
rates at which teachers were retained in the school or in the district. The finding of no significant 
impacts is robust to the use of different samples and methods. 
From the previous year—2007–2008—we had found no impacts on test scores for the early 
adopters of TAP, although we had found evidence of a positive impact on teacher retention in the 
school (Glazerman et al. 2009). Survey data covering that first year of implementation in cohort 1 
schools indicated that changes had taken place as a result of the program’s introduction. This 
suggested that for the period over which we have data, the lack of impacts is not the result of a 
failure to implement TAP at all. However, it should be noted that the Chicago TAP is being phased 
in over time, as discussed below, and was not necessarily tested at its full strength. 
The first point of caution regarding the study findings is methodological. Readers should be 
aware that the new results presented in this report pertain to the period after the randomized control 
group (cohort 2) had begun to implement TAP, and therefore we rely heavily on the matched 
comparison group as an indication of what happens in the absence of TAP. This aspect of the study 
design assumes that the outcomes for observationally similar non-TAP schools represent the 
outcomes we would have observed had the TAP schools not implemented the program. As shown 
in Appendix A, the non-TAP schools were a close fit to the TAP schools on a number of school 
characteristics thought to be related to study outcomes. Nevertheless, there could be unobserved 
reasons why non-TAP schools were on track to have better (or worse) outcomes than their 
counterpart schools. For example, schools could have been chosen for TAP because their principals 
and teaching faculty were motivated to change, in which case the impact estimate would be upward 
biased. Alternatively, the schools selected for TAP could have been those facing challenges that are 
not reflected in the objective administrative data we used for matching, in which case the observed 
impact estimates would be downward biased. 
Another important factor to account for in interpreting the results is the timing of data 
collection. Student achievement was measured in March 2009. This is about two-thirds of the way 
through the second year of TAP implementation for cohort 1 and the first year of implementation 
for cohort 2. To the extent that teacher reforms such as TAP take time to change attitudes and alter 
the school culture, the evidence is preliminary and does not reflect the impacts of the program in its 
steady state. 
Specifically, timing is important because the TAP program is phased in over time and the study 
design anticipated the possibility of startup effects at both the district and school levels. We focused 
on test scores and retention, which may be thought of as final outcomes that take longer to change 
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than—and may be dependent upon—intermediate outcomes such as teacher attitudes, knowledge, 
or practices. At the district level, three aspects of the program were evolving: 
1. Capacity to measure teacher performance resulted in a performance pay component that 
has been phased in over time. In the first year of the program rollout, the district was 
unable to systematically link student test scores to individual teachers, so TAP’s 
performance pay formula was based on school average value added (staff contribution to 
student achievement growth) in addition to classroom observation measures. In the 
second year the payouts were tied to value added that was measured at the grade level 
and subject within each school. By the 2008-2009 school year, the observation period for 
this report, the district had not begun routine reporting of value-added measures of 
performance at the level of the individual teacher. These changes affect the degree to 
which pay can be meaningfully differentiated. 
2. CPS staff are gaining experience implementing the model. The effectiveness of TAP 
cohorts may vary over time as CPS learns how to select schools to participate, train 
school staff, and maintain program support for an increasing number of TAP schools.  
3. The average size of the performance incentives is initially small by design and grows after 
the first year of implementation. The program’s founding document sets an average 
teacher bonus pool of $2,000 in the first year and $4,000 in subsequent years. Payout 
data from the district suggest that the actual performance based payouts were smaller, 
averaging approximately $1,100 in the first year and $2,700 in the second year. 
4. General awareness of the program’s incentive component may require time to diffuse to 
teachers. As with any employee incentive program, the impact of offering bonuses may 
be greater over time as more people become familiar with the payouts and the 
relationship between payouts and performance. The first set of payments was made 
along with a public announcement in December 2008, more than three months into the 
second year of the rollout. 
At the school level there may be additional startup effects. Mentor and lead teachers have to 
become accustomed to their roles, trained as observers and mentors, and gain experience with the 
TAP system of cluster group meetings and observations. It is possible that these activities take time 
to develop to full capacity and effectiveness. Implementing TAP for several years also gives 
principals time to observe and make changes to their roster of mentor and lead teachers. 
In addition to startup effects, one might worry about ―finite horizon‖ effects. That is, Chicago 
TAP was funded in large part by a federal grant of fixed duration. The impact of the program on 
teachers’ career decisions, such as attracting them to work in TAP schools, may have been blunted 
by teacher expectations that the program would not be financially sustained beyond the grant period. 
This is speculation, however, as no data are currently available on teacher attitudes about the 
duration of Chicago TAP. 
Finally, we should caution that a lack of impact finding is simply a lack of evidence rather than a 
proof of no impact. The first two years of the TAP rollout provided us with evidence based on 16 
program schools, and 3 of those schools dropped out of the retention analysis sample due to 
consolidation or program dropout. As a result, true impacts would needed to have been about four 
percent of a standard deviation in test scores or about three percentage points of retention in order 
for us to detect them. 
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The next year of the rollout, however, will add two new cohorts of schools. We randomly 
assigned these schools in spring 2009, with implementation starting in fall 2009 and fall 2010. 
Adding 16 more program schools will double the sample size available for the analysis. We will 
continue to release annual impact reports for the third and fourth year of rollout to follow the 
experiences of the first two cohorts and to add in the experiences of the last two cohorts. 
Collectively, these future reports will provide a more complete picture of the impacts of TAP 
implementation in its first few years. 
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We identified nearly 300 CPS K-8 elementary schools to serve as potential matched comparison 
schools for the TAP schools in the study (cohorts 1 and 2). To form the best possible comparison 
group from among these schools, we employed several propensity score matching algorithms. Using 
the same set of propensity scores, each algorithm selects a different set of comparison schools and 
generates a corresponding set of weights. The goal was to find a comparison group with a close fit 
to the TAP schools under study, judging from pre-intervention measures of school characteristics 
related to study outcomes. The procedures are described in Chapter II. This appendix provides 
additional detail on the matching algorithms. 
1.  Exact Match Criteria/Filters 
Before estimating propensity scores, we first selected schools that met the following basic 
criteria as a potential comparison school: 
 General school (this excludes military schools and schools that serve special-needs 
populations). 
 School was open during the 2006–2007 school year and had data from that year. 
 Previously not selected for TAP cohort 3 or 4. We did not want the possibility of a 
comparison school’s staff knowing it would be implementing the program in the future. 
 Minimum 50 percent of students with low income (eligible for free/reduced-price 
lunch). To be eligible for Chicago TAP, the school had to serve at least 75 percent low-
income students. We used percentage of low-income as a matching variable, but allowed 
the possibility of schools below the threshold to match with schools above it, even 
though in practice it was unlikely that any matches would come from this group. 
2.  Matching Variables 
We matched schools on variables that were measured before the rollout of TAP including pre-
intervention measures of the outcomes of interest: student test scores and teacher retention. We 
standardized spring 2007 math and reading ISAT scores within grade to have a common mean and 
standard deviation by grade (zero and one, respectively) and then averaged across grades for each 
school. Standardizing the test scores reduces the influence of having different proportions of 
students in different grade levels. Retention rates were expressed as the percentage of classroom 
teachers in fall 2005 returning to the same school as classroom teachers in fall 2006, based on CPS 
human resources data. Separately, we measured retention for teachers who were in their first four 
years of service in the district and those who had 5 to 24 years of service. We did not take into 
account retention rates for teachers close to retirement age. This group could not be stably estimated 
nor does it have the same interpretation as early- and mid-career retention. 
We also used 2006–2007 student demographic information, including total school enrollment, 
enrollment squared (to improve matches for very small or large schools), and race/ethnicity. 
Because we observed that most TAP schools could be categorized as nearly all African American, 
with a few nearly all Hispanic or mixed, we collapsed school race/ethnicity into a small number of 
categories to emphasize substantive, rather than minute, qualitative differences. A school that had 
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less than one-third of its students who were African American was given a value of one; one-third to 
two-thirds had a value of two; and more than two-thirds a value of three. (This is equivalent to 
rounding the fraction of African American students to the nearest third). We coded the percentage 
of Hispanic students in the same way. We also used the percentages of students who were low 
income (eligible for free/reduced-price lunch), special education (had an individualized education 
program), and limited English proficient. The last set of matching characteristics we used for 2006–
2007 were indicators of whether the school had made adequate yearly progress (AYP) and if they 
had a truancy rate greater than 50 percent.  
All of the matching variables were used in a logistic regression to estimate the theoretical 
probability for selecting a pool of TAP schools to be randomly assigned to cohort 1 or 2. The 
predicted probability is the propensity score. We examined the score distributions and selected or 
reweighted potential comparison schools to form the best possible comparison group. 
3.  Matching Algorithms 
There are several alternative algorithms for selecting a comparison group, each of which has 
advantages and disadvantages. The nearest neighbor method is probably the most intuitive because 
it is analogous to a balanced random assignment experiment, yesand gives each TAP school a fixed 
number of comparison schools (albeit with some counting more than once because of replacement). 
The propensity score was used to rank all the schools sequentially along a number line. We formed 
two nearest neighbor comparison groups: one using the single nearest neighbor to each TAP school 
and one the other using the five nearest neighbors.  
Another algorithm is called the caliper method because we define a fixed distance in terms of 
propensity score from each TAP school and select all comparison schools that fall within that 
distance, known as a radius. The radius size for the caliper is arbitrary and involves a tradeoff 
between the quality and quantity of matches. A larger radius captures more comparison schools, but 
a smaller one captures more closely matched ones. We examined radii of different lengths and used 
the ones that rendered superior matches in terms of the matching variables described above. 
Finally, we used kernel density matching, which uses the full set of comparison schools but 
allows the weights to vary with distance from TAP schools. For each TAP school, the weight 
corresponding to each comparison school is smaller as the distance from the TAP school is 
greater.14  
4. Diagnostics 
Most of the matching algorithms produced similar results but we had to select one to simplify 
the presentation. We chose the caliper match with a radius of 0.025. This algorithm appeared to 
reduce the initial TAP-comparison differences more than the others. The means for matching 
variables under each method are shown in Table A.1. The first column of data shows the TAP 
means for cohorts 1 and 2 combined and the second shows the unadjusted means for the full set of 
potential comparison schools. In some cases, the means were quite different without any 
                                                 
14 The magnitude of the weight is based on the probability density function (PDF) for the normal distribution, 
which looks like a bell-shaped curve sitting on a number line, centered on the propensity score for each TAP school. 
The weight is proportional to the height of the curve (the kernel) of the normal PDF. 
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adjustment. The weighted comparison group means appear much closer to the TAP means, as we 
would expect. 
A balancing test was applied to each set of comparison means and all passed. That is, we did 
not reject the hypothesis that the distribution of observable characteristics differed between TAP 
and matched comparison schools for any of the matching algorithms. Visual inspection reveals that 
the best match on any given characteristic was always one of the caliper matching algorithms. We 
selected the larger radius caliper because the magnitudes of the differences between that group and 
the TAP group were smaller than those for any other group. 
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Chapter III presented estimates of the impact of TAP in 2008-2009. In order to combine these 
findings with those from 2007-2008, the first year of TAP rollout, and to take advantage of data 
from the prior year as a baseline, before TAP was implemented at all, we conducted a longitudinal 
analysis of data from all three years.  
We conducted the analysis by estimating the same regression that produced the results in 
Chapter III, but with a stacked dataset including each of the three years, year indicators, cohort 
indicators, and the student covariates listed in Chapter II. We adjusted the standard errors to 
account for non-independence of observations and specified the TAP effect in different ways: 
interacted with cohort, interacted with year of implementation, and entered as a main effect with no 
interactions. 
The longitudinal analysis confirms that there was no detectable overall TAP effect from the first 
two years of rollout. We also used the longitudinal data to estimate a TAP effect specific to each 
cohort and alternatively, a TAP effect specific to the first or second year of implementation. The 
regression results, presented in Table B.1, show both interaction models with a statistically 
significant interaction effect for reading achievement. The same models for math scores showed 
similar regression coefficients, but larger standard errors and hence the effects were not statistically 
significant. Results from the first model (columns 1 and 4), imply that TAP was associated with 
reductions in test scores of almost 2 ISAT points in cohort 1 schools, and increases in test scores of 
almost the same amount in cohort 2 schools. Columns 2 and 5 imply that scores were lower in TAP 
schools in their second year of implementation. Again, only the reading effect estimates are 
statistically significant. The other differences are small enough that it is more plausible that they 
could have arisen by chance even if there were no true effect of TAP. The results for overall TAP 
effect are shown in columns 3 and 6. 
We conducted a similar analysis that was confined to the schools that had been subject to 
random assignment, which we refer to as the experimental contrast. The experimental results 
suggest that there was a significant negative impact of TAP in cohort 1 schools; TAP was associated 
with test scores that were about 2 ISAT points lower than non-TAP schools in both reading in 
math. However, when we considered the possibility that TAP had an effect on cohort 2 schools (see 
columns 2 and 4 of Table B.2), the remaining negative effect attributable to TAP was smaller and 
not statistically significant. 
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